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THE RECODIFIED NEW YORK ELECTION





During the 1976 national and local election campaigns, the New
York State Election Law' and its "Byzantine" ' procedures came
under withering attack by both the candidates and .the Press.' The
inadequacies of the existing law had long been recognized and de-
cried by numerous citizens groups and legislators.'
The first step toward much-needed substantive election law re-
form has been taken recently with the passage of an Election Law
Recodification Act.5 The new law, passed under the sponsorship of
Assemblyman Melvin H. Miller, Chairman of the Election Law
Committee, went into effect on December 1, 1977.
The Election Law Recodification is characterized as a
* B.A., St. Francis College; J.D., Fordham University School of Law. Member of the New
York and Florida Bars. Mr. Keohane is associated with the firm of Hawkins, Delafield &
Wood, New York, New York. Mr. Keohane was formerly research director for various standing
committees of the New York State Senate.
** Class of 1978, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., Fordham University.
1. N. Y. ELEC. LAW, §§ 1-422 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
2. N. Y. Times, March 20, 1976, p. 12, col. 6.
3. For example: "[Tihe whole thing is an invisible process. If the average voter could
see what was happening in here, they'd think it was something out of Kafka." Statement of
Mark Alcott, lawyer for the Carter campaign, referring to the judicial review of the Carter
petitions. Id. "The New York Election Laws exclude the average voter in New York ....
The people who signed our delegate petitions have been effectively disenfranchised because
they forgot to dot their i's." Statement of Paul Rivet, lawyer for the Carter campaign, made
in conjunction with the announcement that the Carter forces would go into federal court to
seek reinstatement of delegate slates in ten congressional districts. Id. March 29, 1976, p. 20,
col. 4. "Jimmy Carter's last words to New York voters were 'Vote for me' and then, in an
afterthought, 'Where my name is on the ballot, vote for me.' " Id. April 30, 1976, p. 12, col.
6. However, the existing law was a two-edged sword waiting to be used by its one-time
victims, as the New York Times editorialized regarding the subsequent attack by supporters
of candidate Carter on the independent petitions of former Senator Eugene McCarthy. Id.
October 9, 1976, p. 18 (editorial).
4. League of Women Voters, LEGISLATIVE MEMORANDUM 1 (1976).
5. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, as amended, 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 234 (McKinney 1976).
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"simplification and clarification of present law"' which "should not
generate controversy among the members of the legislature . . . .
Nonetheless, the recodification has effected changes which are of
importance to most citizens. This Article will examine these
changes and describe their effect upon voting, registration and party
enrollment,' designation and nomination of candidates,' the con-
duct of elections"' and judicial review procedures."
II. Administration of Elections
The New York State Constitution requires equal representation
of the two major political parties in the administration of elections,"
6. N. Y. State Assembly Committee on the Election Law, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 1
(1976).
7. Id. The same refrain was echoed in the memorandum of the League of Women
Voters, which indicaied that "[miost importantly, the bill by and large does not go beyond
the scope of the meaning of 'recodification.' In other words, it does not make changes that
warrant separate legislative consideration." League of Women Voters, LEGISLATIVE
MEMORANDUM 1 (1976). However, the League concedes that the new law "eliminates provi-
sions which were contradictory, which had been made obsolete by enactment of superceding
laws. It consolidates and reorganizes the law into logical order, eliminating most duplica-
tion." Id.
The recodification furnishes a procedural framework into which substantive changes can
later be incorporated. One memorandum in support of the law indicated:
The bill contains a minimum of substantive changes, none of which are of major
significance, but makes numerous technical and procedural amendments. We find no
problem with such changes, and agree with the sponsors that substantive amend-
ments, while needed, will be best left to separate legislation so as not to impede passage
and approval of the recodification. We also note that the bill does not take effect until
December 1, 1977, which will enable possible deficiencies to be corrected during the
1977 legislative session.
N.Y. State Board of Elections, MEMORANDUM 1 (1976).
8. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, §§ 5-100 to 5-502 (McKinney 1976).
9. Id. §§ 6-100 to 6-166.
10. Id. §§ 8-100 to 9-220.
11. Id. §§ 16-100 to 16-118.
12. N. Y. CONST. art. 2, § 8 provides:
All laws creating, regulating or affecting boards or officers charged with the duty of
registering voters, or of distributing ballots to voters, or of receiving, recording or
counting votes at elections, shall secure equal representation of the two political parties
which, at the general election next preceding that for which such boards or officers are
to serve, cast the highest and the next highest number of votes. All such boards and
officers shall be appointed or elected in such manner, and upon the nomination of such
representatives of said parties respectively, as the legislature may direct. Existing laws
on this subject shall continue until the legislature shall otherwise provide. This section
shall not apply to town, or village elections.
Village elections are governed by Article 15 of the new law. Pursuant to the provisions of
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including registration of voters, distribution of ballots, and the re-
ceiving, recording and counting of votes at elections. 3
Although the purpose of this constitutional provision is "to guar-
antee equality of representation to the two majority political par-
ties" on boards charged with election administration,"4 its effect
often has been both to impede fraud-free elections,"5 and to hinder
the other established political parties. 6 Moreover, bipartisan ad-
ministration of elections may not always accomplish the primary
purpose of the Election Law: the citizen's right freely and fairly to
choose those who will govern them. 7
section 15-116 this dual party representation may be the exception rather than the rule. See,
e.g., McMahon v. Village of Menands, 89 Misc. 2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See Note, Election
Administration in New York City: Pruning the Political Thicket, 84 Yale L. J. 61, 72-77, 82-
84 (1974), discussing the constitutionality of the method of selecting election officials on a
bipartisan basis.
13. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 8.
14. People v. Voorhis, 236 N.Y. 437, 446, 141 N.E. 907, 910 (1923).
15. See, e.g., Note, Election Administration in New York: Pruning the Political Thicket,
84 Yale L. J. 61 (1974).
16. In Bishop v. Lomenzo, 350 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), plaintiffs asked a three-
judge federal court to declare unconstitutional those provisions of the New York Election Law
which provided that only enrolled members of the two major political parties (historically,
Democratic and Republican) could act as registrars, thus excluding members of the Liberal
and Conservative Parties as well as independent voters. The court found that the restrictions
did not affect the fundamental right to vote, and that if, arguendo, a compelling state interest
were required to be shown to justify such a restriction, "ample justification" was shown by
New York's interest in minimizing irregularities and the risk of fraud. Id. at 589.
In Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), members of
the Socialist Workers Party charged that the bipartisan composition of the various Boards of
Elections denied members of other parties due process in determining the legal suffrage of
nominating (and, impliedly, designating) petitions. The district court rejected such argument
on the bases that (1) board actions are merely ministerial (see notes 206-12 and accompany-
ing text infra); (2) there was judicial review of such actions (see notes 213-20 and accompany-
ing text infra); and (3) there was a failure to demonstrate specific examples of abuse. For a
contrary view see Weiss v. Duberstein, 445 F. 2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1971) which found the actions
of the Board of Elections of the City of New York to be more than ministerial. Weiss chal-
lenged the then existing Election Law which limited the four Election Commissioner positions
on the Board of Election to the choices of the New York County and Kings County Republican
and Democratic County Chairmen. After such provision was declared unconstitutional, Weiss
v. Duberstein, (Civil No. C70-1200 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 1, 1971)), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972)), remedial state legislation expanded the size of the Board
to ten and provided for appointment by the Republican and Democratic chairman of each of
the five counties that comprise the City of New York.
See also Note, Election Administration in New York City: Pruning the Political Thicket,
84 Yale L. J. 61 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Crane v. Voorhis, 257 N.Y. 298, 178 N.E. 169 (1931); Hopper v. Britt, 203
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The court of appeals consistently has sought to implement the
right of voters to choose those who will govern, indicating a belief
that party organization should not control the political process. In
upholding the principle of free and fair elector choice, the court in
In re Callahan8 held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting a party
committee from nominating as its own candidate a candidate of
another party."9 The court stated that the committee had the right
to vote "for whom they will."0 Similarly, in Hopper v. Britt,' the
court invalidated a law which prohibited a multi-party candidate
from having his name printed on the ballot more than once. In
striking down the provision, the court indicated that every voter
must be afforded the right to cast his vote under the party line of
his choice.2 Finally in Coffey v. Democratic Committee," the court
of appeals pointed out that the intent of the Election Law was to
assure the citizen that his wishes may be expressed by his ballot,
regardless of the wishes of political party leaders. "In other words,
the scheme is to permit the voters to construct the organization from
the bottom upwards, instead of permitting leaders to construct it
from the top downwards." 4
Yevoli v. Cristenfeld"5 involved a challenge to the Democratic and
Republican County Committees' rules prohibiting support of candi-
dates who had accepted the endorsement of other political parties."
The lower court, noting that the restriction was aimed primarily at
the Liberal and Conservative Parties, held the rule invalid:27
[The restrictions] contravene the basic philosophy of our democratic sys-
tem, which forbids such undue impairment of the frarichise .... The whole
purpose of the Election Law and of the Constitution under which it is en-
acted, is that, within reasonable bounds and regulations, all voters shall, so
N.Y. 144, 96 N.E. 371 (1911); Yevoli v. Cristenfeld, 37 App. Div. 2d 153, 322 N.Y.S.2d 750
(2d Dep't), rev'd 29 N.Y.2d 591, 272 N.E.2d 898, 324 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1971).
18. 200 N.Y. 59, 93 N.E. 262 (1910).
19. Id. at 61, 93 N.E. at 262.
20. Id.
21. 203 N.Y. 144, 96 N.E. 371 (1911).
22. Id. at 151, 96 N.E. at 373.
23. 164 N.Y. 335 (1900).
24. Id. at 342.
25. 29 N.Y.2d 591, 272 N.E.2d 898, 324 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1971).
26. Id. at 592, 272 N.E.2d at 898, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
27. 37 App. Div. 2d 153, 155, 322 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753 (2d Dep't 1971).
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far as the law provides, have equal, easy and unrestricted opportunities to
declare their choice for each office ...
The court of appeals reversed28 on the basis of the dissent in the
appellate division. While the decision may appear inconsistent with
the principle of full and fair voter choice, the appellate division
dissent emphasized the limited role of the party committee in the
election process:29
[e]xcept in special elections and in the filling of vacancies, the county com-
mittee does not nominate the candidates of its party. What it does do is
endorse, i.e., recommend, a potential candidate to the enrolled voters of its
party. That candidate must then seek his party's nomination in its primary
election.
The court of appeals expressed the same view in Kooperstein v.
Power, ° where insurgent designees for certain judicial positions
challenged the petitions of designees supported by the New York
County Democratic Executive Committee. The insurgents claimed
that the latter designations had not been approved by the Demo-
cratic Party County Committee for New York County." In rejecting
the challenge, the court stated that the designations were made by
proper petitions and not by the actions of the party committees.2
In following the principles of the Election Law, the courts tradi-
tionally have given administrative requirements a liberal construc-
tion. Thus in the absence of fraud, the will of the people will not be
thwarted by technicalities requiring precise compliance.33 However,
liberality of construction is not to be carried to extremes,34 and "a
28. 29 N.Y.2d 591, 272 N.E.2d 898, 324 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1971).
29. 37 App. Div. 2d 153, 158, 322 N.Y.S.2d 750, 755 (2d Dep't 1971) (Latham & Shapiro,
J.J., dissenting).
30. 153 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 655, 153 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1st Dep't),
afl'd, 1 N.Y.2d 868, 136 N.E.2d 708, 154 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
31. 153 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Rosen v. McNab, 25 N.Y.2d 798, 250 N.E.2d 709, 303 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1969).
34. In In re Burns, 199 Misc. 1005, 1008, 106 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1951) the court
stated:
We have here a designating petition where the election board in the first instance
rejected more than one third of the names on the designating petition as invalid for
various reasons, a figure the respondent does not dispute, and an additional 1,310 have
been found to be invalid on this trial by direct testimony. There comes a time when
the respondent should be called upon to come forward with proof of the legality of the
remaining petitions. The court finds this time has arrived.
In the absence of any testimony, I find that all of the designating petitions signed
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consistent pattern of surface irregularity is fatal to a claim of sub-
stantial compliance. . ,,3 notwithstanding the absence of fraud-
ulent intent .3
The recodified Election Law, following the mandate of the state
Constitution, 37 retains bipartisan control of registration proce-
dures, 3 designation of election inspectors, 3' and membership on el-
ection boards. 40 Thus, independent and third-party registrants are
not likely to have significant control over the administration of the
franchise."
by the subscribing witnesses directly attacked, amounting to an additional 311 sheets,
containing an additional 1,489 signatures, are also invalid. This computation of 2,799
signatures found to be invalid, leaves a balance of 1,320 valid signatures, far short of
the required number to place Mr. Sullivan's name on the Democratic primary ballot.
The court does not find that Mr. Sullivan had knowledge of the irregularity of the
designating petitions, but by the same token he cannot profit thereby.
The narrow line between good faith mistake and utter disregard for the law gave rise to a
sharply worded dissent from Judge Matthew J. Jasen in Ruiz v. McKenna, 40 N.Y.2d 815,
355 N.E.2d 787, 387 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1976). Of 2,570 signatures filed 1,514 were struck by the
Board of Elections or a referee in the supreme court. However, the majority found no inference
that candidate McKenna was guilty of any fraud. Judge Jasen noted that McKenna was
dissatisfied at the technique, pace and results of a door-to-door campaign for signatures. He
therefore decided to solicit the signatures of passersby. Judge Jasen indicated that rampant
disregard of technical formalities should prove fatal to a candidate's petition:
Where irregularities are not the product of deceitful intent or fraudulent design, a
pattern of irregularities bespeaks either incompetence in execution of methods or indif-
ference to the need for compliance with the requirements of the Election Law. The
ultimate danger is that both incompetence and indifference may mask corrupt, if not
fraudulent practices. . . .It should be even more obvious that a consistent pattern of
surface irregularity is fatal to a claim of substantial compliance. .-. . Where the
undisputed evidence establishes a pattern of willful fraud; or ignorance of the statutory
provisions, or inartful and incompetent execution of methods appropriate to achieve
compliance with statute, and the pattern permeates an entire petition, it is well within
the traditional powers of the court to declare that as a matter of law, in the truest sense
of that term of art, the entire petition is invalid.
Id. at 818, 355 N.E.2d at 788, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added). See also text accompanying notes 181-97 infra.
35. Ruiz v. McKenna, 40 N.Y.2d 815, 818, 355 N.E.2d 787, 788, 387 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559
(1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
36. Id. See note 34 supra.
37. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 3. See note 12 supra.
38. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 5-202(2) (McKinney 1976).
39. Id. § 3-400(4).
40. Id. § 3-300.
41. See note 16 supra.
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III. Qualifications for Voting
A. Qualifications of Voters
The power of the state to establish voter qualifications or restric-
tions is generally well established;42 the state may even impose re-
strictions on federal elections, if such restrictions are not arbitrary
and are designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot." However,
any qualifications or restrictions which have the effect of restricting
or denying the franchise of any group must be carefully scrutinized.
In determining whether such a law violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court must consider the
facts and circumstances surrounding the law, the governmental in-
terest which the state claims to be protecting, and the interests of
those who are disadvantaged by the exclusionary classification."
When the law interferes with the right to vote, the equal protection
clause requires strict scrutiny of the classification." Under this test,
the suspect classification must further a substantial and compelling
state interest.46 Furthermore, if there are several reasonable meth-
42. See Atkin v. Board of Elec., 30 N.Y.2d 401, 285 N.E.2d 687, 334 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1972);
Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 209 N.E.2d 539, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1965); Camacho v.
Doe, 31 Misc. 2d 692, 221 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
43. See Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 209 N.E.2d 539, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1965).
44. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Dart v. Howell, 45 App. Div. 2d 47, 356 N.Y.S.2d 118 (3d Dep't), aff'd,
35 N.Y.2d 847, 321 N.E.2d 877, 363 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1974).
45. See note 46 infra.
Traditional equal protection analysis utilizes one of two tests: the rational basis test and
the compelling state interest test. A classification having a legitimate state interest would
generally be sustained if there were a rational basis for it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961). If the classification involved a suspect class or a fundamental right, then it would
be subjected to the strict scrutiny test. The classification would be upheld only if it served a
compelling state interest and was the least restrictive means available for achieving that
interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Suspect classifications include race, Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967); alienage, In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); and national origin, Oyama v. California, 322 U.S. 633 (1948).
Fundamental rights have been held to include voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of of Elec., 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); and procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In addition,
there are various intermediate approaches of equal protection analysis which require more
than a rational basis but less than compelling reasons. Under these approaches, the court will
balance the state interest advanced against the right interfered with. For a thorough discus-
sion of these tests, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, The 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1972).
46. Dart v. Howell, 45 App. Div. 2d 47, 356 N.Y.S.2d 118 (3d Dep't 1974).
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ods of pursuing this interest, the test requires that the state choose
the method least likely to interfere with the constitutionally pro-
tected activity.47
1. Age Requirements
The New York State Constitution provides that every citizen
shall be entitled to vote at every election, "provided that such citi-
zen is twenty-one years of age or over and shall have been a resident
of this state, and of the county, city, or village for three months next
preceding an election." However, changes in federal law, court
decisions and conforming provisions of state law have altered these
requirements drastically.4"
Since the enactment of the twenty-sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution,0 all but five states have instituted leg-
islation lowering the age of majority in state elections to eighteen.'
Three of the remaining states have lowered the age to nineteen,"
while two states have made no amendment and retain twenty-one
as the minimum age for voting in state elections." The recodified
Election Law provides that to be eligible to vote in New York State,
a citizen must be eighteen years of age or over on the day of the
election, and a resident of this state and of his county, city or village
for the 30 days preceding the election.54
2. Residency Requirements
In Atkin v. Onondaga County Board of Elections,55 the court of
47. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
48. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
49. See note 54, infra and accompanying text. See generally, Note, Developments in the
Law: Elections, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111 (1975); Comment, Access to Voter Registration, 9 Harv.
Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 482 (1974).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI provides: "The right of citizens of the United States, who
are 18 years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any state on account of age."
51. See Note, The Effect of the New Age of Majority on Pre-Existing Child Support
Settlements, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 365, 365, n.2 (1977).
52. Id. (Alaska, Nebraska and Wyoming).
53. Id. (Mississippi and Alabama).
54. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 5-102(1) (McKinney 1976). Although there is a constitu-
tional right to vote, the courts have found no such right to vote by absentee ballot. See, e.g.,
Colaneri v. McNab, 90 Misc. 2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Eber v. Board of Elections, 80 Misc. 2d
334 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
55. 30 N.Y.2d 401, 285 N.E.2d 687, 334 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1972).
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appeals ruled that the state constitutional and statutory provisions
requiring a voter to be a resident "of the county, city, or village for
three months next preceding an election,"56 were not designed to
meet a compelling state interest, and therefore violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." The three-month
time limit was held to be an arbitrary and unconstitutional stan-
dard.5" However, not all durational residency requirements are arbi-
trary and unconstitutional under this standard. In Atkin, the state
Attorney General indicated that a thirty-day durational require-
ment would be more reasonable, and this limit has been incorpo-
rated into the recodified Election Law. 59
For the purpose of registering and voting, certain persons, includ-
ing students,'" inmates of asylums or public care facilities,' and
prisoners"2 neither gain nor lose residence by reason of their status."
The prior Election Law required a member of any of these classes
to file with the Board of Elections taking his registration "a written
statement showing where he actually resides and where he claims
to be legally domiciled, his business or occupation, his business
address, and to which class he claims to belong."64 The recodified
law now requires a similar statement from any voter "who has re-
moved from his residence but who is still eligible to vote from that
address." 5
3. Literacy Requirements
The state Constitution provides that "no person shall become
entitled to vote by attaining majority, by naturalization or other-
56. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 150 (McKinney 1972).
57. 30 N.Y.2d at 405, 285 N.E.2d at 688, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 379. See also Note, 1 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 274 (1972).
58. 30 N.Y.2d at 405, 285 N.E.2d at 688, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
59. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 5-102(1) (McKinney 1976).
60. Id. § 5-104(1). Cf. Palla v. Board of Elec., 31 N.Y.2d 36, 50, 286 N.E.2d 247, 254, 334
N.Y.S.2d 860, 870 (1972), which held that "where students are in fact residents, intending
New York for a permanent home, they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to equal
opportunity for political representation." See also Note, 24 Syracuse L. Rev. 852 (1973).
61. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 5-104(1) (McKinney 1976). Cf. lafrate v. Board of Elec.,
42 N.Y.2d 991, 398 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1977), in which voluntary residents of a psychiatric center
were permitted to offer evidence as to residence.
62. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 5-104(1) (McKinney 1976).
63. Id.
64. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 151 (McKinney 1972).
65. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 5-222 (McKinney 1976).
1977]
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wise, unless such person is also able, except for physical disability,
to read and write English."6 However, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled literacy criteria unconstitutional, 6 and the recodi-
fled Election Law has removed the literacy requirement from con-
sideration in testing voter eligibility."
4. Other Disabilities and Requirements
The recodified Election Law continues to exclude from suffrage
any person: (1) convicted of bribery (insofar as the bribery affected
an election)6"; (2) convicted of any other crime equivalent to a felony
under New York law (or under federal law where a federal court has
exclusive jurisdiction), unless he has been pardoned or his maxi-
mum sentence of imprisonment has expired or he has been dis-
charged from parole;70 or (3) "adjudged incompetent or committed
to an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally ill or
mentally defective by order of competent judicial authority." 7'
B. Qualifications of Registrants
In addition to the qualifications of voters, the second requirement
for voting in New York State is registration. Section 5-100 of the
recodified Election Law reads in pertinent part:
A person shall not be entitled to vote in any election held pursuant to this
chapter unless he shall be registered, and if required, enrolled pursuant to
the provisions of this article unless he shall present a court order directing
that he be permitted to vote at such election."
Therefore, in addition to meeting citizenship, age and residency
requirements," the prospective voter must register or vote at least
66. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § !.
67. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
68. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 5-104 (McKinney 1976).
69. Id. § 5-106(1). For a discussion of the proper venue or "injured forum" in a case
allegedly involving improper use of authority in exchange for a contribution to an election
campaign see, Steingut v. Gold, 42 N.Y.2d 311, - N.E.2d , - N.Y.S.2d . (1977),
afg 54 App. Div. 2d 481 (2d Dep't 1976).
70. Id. § 5-106(2),(3),(4).
71. Id. § 5-106(6).
72. Id. § 5-100. Furthermore, sections 5-400 and 5-406 provide for the cancellation of
registration of voters who fail to vote throughout the two preceding calendar years. Sections
1 and 6 of Article 2 of the New York State Constitution authorize the enactment of the above
sections of the Election Law.
73. See notes 42-65 and accompanying text supra.
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every two years, or his registration will be cancelled.
The constitutionality and practicality of the two year reregistra-
tion requirement is questionable. Legislation cancelling registration
for failure to vote recently has been subjected to scrutiny on four-
teenth amendment equal protection grounds. In Michigan State
UWA Community Action Program Council v. Austin,7' the Michi-
gan Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute which
imposed cancellation of registration for failure to vote within two
years.7" A federal district court found a similar one year reregistra-
tion statute unconstitutional in Beare v. Smith.7 Both the Austin
and Beare decisions viewed the respective cancellation provisions as
an interference with the fundamental right to vote.
Assuming that such one or two year statutes are unconstitutional,
the contention that all reregistration statutes are invalid does not
necessarily follow." In addition, providing a longer period before
cancellation might avoid constitutional attacks upon the statute
while maintaining the legitimate state interest in preventing fraud
and permitting wider exercise of the franchise.
IV. Registration and Enrollment
Once a person has (or will by the succeeding election)7 fulfilled
the eligibility requirements, that person may register centrally,7
locally, 0 or specially by mail."' Central registration is conducted at
74. 387 Mich. 506, 198 N.W.2d 385 (1972). See Note, Equal Protection Prohibits a State
From Cancelling Voter Registration for Failure to Vote, 21 Kan. L. Rev. 224 (1973); Com-
ment, Election Laws: The Purge For Failure to Vote, 7 Conn. L. Rev. 372 (1975).
75. 387 Mich. at 520, 198 N.W.2d at 390.
76. 321 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Tex. 1971), afl'd sub nom. Beare v. Briscoe, 498 F. 2d 244
(5th Cir. 1974).
77. In Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973), the Supreme Court, in dictum, stated:
We recognize that a person does not have a federal constitutional right to walk up to
a voting place on election day and demand a ballot. States have valid and sufficient
interests in providing for some period of time-prior to an election-in order to prepare
adequate voter records and protect its electoral processes from possible frauds.
Such reasoning should also apply to preregistration requirement.
78. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 5-102 (McKinney 1976).
79. Id. § 5-200.
80. Id. § 5-202.
81. Id. § 5-210. Failure to register properly need not preclude one from voting in any event,
since Section 8-302(b) of the recodified New York Election Law provides a mechanism for a
voter challenged for improper registration to vote after filling out an affidavit. See text
accompanying note 90 infra.
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the offices of the Board of Elections and is available to voters during
specified times of the year." The recodified Election Law also pro-
vides that "any qualified person" 3 may register by mail.84 Each
county Board of Elections is required to make registration applica-
tion forms "as freely and widely distributed as possible."" In addi-
tion, Boards of Elections are required to hold local registration at
least once a year upon published notice to prospective registrants. 8
Failure to provide adequately for local registration may result in the
reopening of registration. This was the case in Elsner v. Boothroyd,7
in which the appellate division directed the county Board of Elec-
tions to reopen registration after a judicial determination that the
Board had failed to provide adequate local registration facilities. 8
Justice John Larkin dissented, claiming that the applicants had not
made dilligent efforts to register at the time and place made avail-
able by the Board.89
Failure to be registered properly need not preclude a person from
casting his ballot. The recodified Election Law permits one chal-
lenged for lack of registration to vote after completing an affidavit
stating that he or she is validly registered in another election district
and is still a duly qualified voter in that district. The same proce-
dure is available to those whose poll record has been lost or mis-
placed .,I
The recodified statute also provides for transfer of registration
and enrollment,"' and allows a voter to change2 or correct93 his en-
82. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 5-200 (McKinney 1976).
83. Id. § 5-210(1).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 5-202. Section 5-202 requires that the period of registration begin no earlier than
the sixth Saturday nor later than the fourth Saturday preceeding the general election.
87. 54 App. Div. 2d 989, 388 N.Y.S.2d 48 (3rd Dep't 1976).
88. Id. at 989, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The court did not state what its standard of adequacy
was, but merely held that where the board provided a nine-month central voter registration
period, a ten-month mail registration period, and two personal registration days during the
eleven months immediately preceding election day, it had "failed to provide adequate local
registration." Id.
89. Id. (Larkin, J., dissenting). The trial court had found that 46% of the applicants gave
no reason for failing to register other than "I didn't have the time," or "My time is too
valuable."
90. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 8-302 (6)(b) (McKinney 1976).
91. Id. § 5-208.
92. Id. § 5-304.
93. Id. § 5-306.
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rollment. Enrollment pertains to a voter's selection of a particular
party94 (or choice to remain an independent voter)" and determines
the voter's right to participate in primary elections. Transfer of
registration and enrollment can be an important consideration for
a citizen who wishes to vote or run as a candidate in primary elec-
tions. Unless a specific request for a "transfer" of registration is
made after a voter changes residence, there is a danger that the
transfer will be handled as a new or changed enrollment, which does
not take effect until the "first Tuesday following the next succeed-
ing general election," 7 thus precluding his participation in that
election or its primaries.
In Sullivan v. Power," the appellate division considered whether
94. Id. § 5-300.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 5-308.
97. Id. § 5-304 (3). Proper transfers of enrollment gave rise to actions against two promi-
nent personalities, Allard Lowenstein, in Wydler v. Christenfeld, 35 N.Y.2d 719, 320 N.E.2d
278, 361 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (1974) and Maurice Nadjari, in Beary v. Nadjari, (Sup. Ct. 1977)
N.Y.S.2d - , - N.Y.S. 2d - , rev'd sub nom. In re Beltrami, 59 App. Div. 2d 568,
397 N.Y.S. 2d 825 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 981, - N.E.2d -, 398 N.Y.S. 2d 408
(1977). Wydler was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See notes 130-31 and accompanying text
infra.
In Beary the supreme court determined that Maurice Nadjari was an enrolled member of
the Republican Party in Suffolk County, New York from 1969 to November, 1976, when he
moved to Queens County, New York. In January 1977, Nadjari executed an "Application for
Registration and Enrollment" by mail pursuant to section 153 of the Election Law. In March
1977, he received from the Queens Board of Elections a "Notice of Acceptance by the Board
of Elections of Registration and Enrollment Application by Mail." In July 1977, petititons
were filed designating Mr. Nadjari as the Republican candidate for the office of District
Attorney in Queens County. No "Wilson-Pakula" designation was filed. The supreme court
read Section 407-a of the Election Law (now Section 5-208), permitting immediate transfers
of enrollment strictly as applying only to transfers within a county or the City of New York
and invalidated the Nadjari candidacy. The appellate division reversed noting the history of
the transfer statute:
Prior to 1976, persons who moved from one county to another, except within the City
of New York, after the cut-off date, were barred by the delayed-enrollment scheme
from voting in the next primary election. When sections 186 and 187 of the Election
Law (which, as then enacted, prescribed the delayed-enrollment scheme) were at-
tacked as unconstitutional (see Echevarria v. Carey, 402 F. Supp. 183, affld 538 F. 2d
309), the Legislature amended the statute so as to allow for intercounty transfers of
enrollment with immediate voting rights (L. 1976, ch. 347). (The Echevarria action was
later dismissed as moot due to the intervening New York legislation). That amendment
must be read with the provisions of section 407-a of the Election Law and, conse-
quently, it authorizes the transfer of the appellant's enrollment from Suffolk County
to Queens County and gives the appellant the right to be designated as a candidate
by petitioner.
98. 24 App. Div. 2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 854, 210 N.E.2d
652, 263 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1965).
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persons who had changed their residence to new election districts
but had not transferred their enrollments, were qualified to witness
designating petitions:
The subscribing witnesses ... on their respective registrations ... became
"enrolled voters" of the "same political party as the voters qualified to sign
the petition, . . .[and therefore were] "enrolled voters" of [that] party as
of the time of the obtaining and witnessing of the signatures and the subscrib-
ing of their respective authenticating statements, and as of the time of the
filing of the petitions [even though their enrollments had not been trans-
ferred]."
Once enrolled a voter may have his enrollment cancelled for
falsely making a material statement in the voter declaration, 0 or
for not being in sympathy with the principles of the party in which
he enrolled. °' While initially this may appear to violate the first
amendment right of freedom of association, courts have presumed
the validity of declarations of party allegiance, unless affirmative
proof to the contrary is adduced. 0° If this proof is presented, the
decision to cancel party enrollment is based upon the principle of
preserving the integrity of the political parties:
A condition of membership in a political party is the sympathy with its
principles and the purpose of fostering and effectuating them . . . .The
Legislature of this State in its wisdom enacted the Wilson-Pakula Law...
by virtue of which it sought to restrict, according to its terms, the manner in
which one could or could not invade the political party of which one was not
a member to obtain party or public offices. Its purpose was to protect the
integrity of political parties and to prevent the invasion into or the capture
of control of political parties by persons not in sympathy with the principles
of such political parties. The constitutionality of such legislation has been
sustained. 13
Party sympathy is determined by the actions of the enrolled
member,0 4 such as the circulation of petitions for candidates of
99. Id. at 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
100. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 16-110(1) (McKinney 1976). Additional causes of cancella-
tion are death and change of address. Id. Allegations of fraud, however, need be both definite
and substantial. Behan v. O'Toole, 154 N.Y.S. 2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
101. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 16-110(2) (McKinney 1976).
102. Warren County Conservative Party v. Girard, 78 Misc. 2d 964, 359 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup.
Ct. 1974).
103. Werbel v. Gernstein, 191 Misc. 275, 277, 78 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441-42 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
273 App. Div. 917, 78 N.Y.S.2d 926 (2d Dep't 1948).
104. In In re Mendelsohn, 197 Misc. 2d 993, 99 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub nor.,
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opposing parties. 03 Before the enrollment can be cancelled, how-
ever, the enrolled member is entitled to adequate notice and a hear-
ing before the chairman of the county committee of the party with
which the voter is enrolled. 06
V. Candidacies and Petitions
A. Requirements
Candidacies in New York are achieved primarily through conven-
tion'07 or by petition,0 8 under either independent 0' or political party
auspices." 0 Any candidate for statewide office who receives twenty-
five percent of the vote of an established state party committee may
run in the primary election."' However, failure to secure a designa-
tion at the state committee level does not preclude the candidate
from getting on the primary ballot via petition.' Petitions for state-
wide office must be signed by twenty thousand enrolled party mem-
bers or by five percent of the party's total enrollment, whichever is
less."' Candidates for most local offices need only secure the signa-
Mendelsohn v. Wolpin, 277 App. Div. 947, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1022, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 670, 94 N.E.2d
254 (1950), the supreme court was convinced that the challenged member of the Democratic
Party had sought the approval of the Bronx Executive Committee of the Liberal Party before
enrolling as a Democrat. In a related case, the court struck the same person's designation as
a member of the State Assembly on the basis that the cancellation of enrollment ordered in
Mendelsohn on August 4, 1950, related back to the date of the challenge to such enrollment
and effectively voided designating petitions filed on July 18, 1950. Wolpin v. Hefferman, 197
Misc. 989, 99 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct., 227 App. Div. 947, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't), aff'd,
301 N.Y. 672, 94 N.E.2d 255 1950). See notes 128-32 and accompanying text infra, with regard
to designations of persons not enrolled in the designating party.
105. Zucker v. Donahue, 191 Misc. 399, 79 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct.), modified 274 App.
Div. 216, 80 N.Y.S.2d 698 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 627, 81 N.E.2d 371 (1948).
106. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 16-110(2) (McKinney 1976); Brennan v. Grabowski, 47
App. Div. 2d 653, 364 N.Y.S.2d 30 (2d Dep't 1975); Warren County Conservative Party v.
Girard, 78 Misc. 2d 964, 359 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
107. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233 §§ 6-100 - 6-166 (McKinney 1976). The use of proxy notes at
a party caucus has been held violative of "one man, one vote" for diluting the vote of the
qualified voters who attend in person. Atkins v. Monahan, 91 Misc. 2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
108. Id. § 6-118.
109. Id. §§ 6-138, 6-140 and 6-142.
110. Id. §§ 6-104 - 6-118.
111. Id. § 6-104(2). The candidate must make a demand to be placed on the ballot within
seven days of the state committee meeting. Id,
112. Id. § 6-134(1).
113. Id. New York formerly required a distribution of such signatures in each county but
that provision was held unconstitutional as an effective dilution of the rights of the electo-
rate. Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 400 U.S. 806
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tures of five percent of the enrolled party members residing in the
political unit in which the voting is to occur."'
Candidacy requirements vary from office to office," 5 but no one
may be designated or nominated to a political office who (1) is not
a citizen of the state; (2) is not eligible to be elected to the office;
or (3) if elected, would not be able to meet the constitutional or
statutory qualification by the time he took office." 6
The form of the designating petition has been modified to include
a representation by the signers that they are entitled to vote at the
next primary election" 7 and to exclude a representation of support
for the designated candidates."' In addition, the petitioner must
designate a committee of enrolled party members to fill vacancies
on the primary ballot if the designated individual is unable to be a
candidate." ' The petition is completed by a witness statement,
which is deemed the equivalent of a sworn statement, 2 ° attesting
(1970). For a discussion of distribution provisions and possible violations of equal protection,
see, Note, Constitutional Law-Elections, 50 Temple L.Q. 911 (1977).
114. Id. § 6-136(2).
115. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 7 (member of legislature); Id. art. 4, § 2, (governor
and lieutenant governor). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2(2) (member of the House of Representa-
tives); and Id. art. I, § 3(3) (United States Senator).
116. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-122. But see Mark v. Van Wart, 68 Misc. 2d 40, 325
N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1971), in which the Board of Elections of the County of Westchester
was directed to accept petitions to nominate Edward Mark, a minor, as a candidate for the
office of member of the City Council although such candidate would not have been eligible
to serve until eighteen days after commencement of the term of office, since section 30 of the
New York State Public Officers Law permitted thirty days for the taking of the oath of office.
Interestingly enough, since candidate Mark was a minor, his mother had to file the petition
for judicial review. Id. at 40, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 768. In Brayman v. Stevens, 54 Misc.2d 974,
977, 283 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937 (Sup. Ct.) aff'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 1095, 285 N.Y.S.2d.280 (2d Dep't
1967) the court invalidated an attempt to nominate the same person to two different offices
since the candidate, if successful would only be able to hold one office at a time.
117. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-132(1). (McKinney 1976).
118. Id. (amending N.Y. ELc. LAW § 135 (McKinney 1976)).
119. Id. See text accompanying note 128 infra.
120. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-132(2) (McKinney 1976) (witness statement); § 6-132(3)
(notary statement). In section 135 of the former law, a petition taken by one authorized to
take an affidavit was favored method of collection although this has been revised in sections
6-132 and 6-140 of the recodified New York Election Law.
The statement to be executed by the notary or commissioner of deeds recites that the
person who signed the petition sheet did so in the presence of the appropriate officer, and,
being duly sworn, said that the subscribed statement was true. Failure to comply strictly with
the taking of an appropriate oath or affirmation may lead to the invalidating of the petition.
Donnelly v. Dowd, 12 N.Y.2d 651, 185 N.E.2d 10, 232 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1962); see also Lombardi
v. State Bd. of Elec., 54 App. Div. 2d 533, 386 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976). There is, however, a
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that the petition was signed in the presence of the witness by per-
sons duly identified to the witness.' 1 The form of a nominating
petition for an independent nomination is substantially the same as
a designating petition for a party candidacy.'22
Petitions are circulated during designated periods 3 and are filed
at either a local or state Board of Elections. 4 A person designated
as a candidate in any manner other than a primary election may
decline the nomination by filing a signed and acknowledged state-
ment."5 If the nominee is not an enrolled member of the party which
selected him, or is conducting an independent candidacy, he must
specifically accept the designation in writing.'
Candidate incapacities creating a vacancy may be filled by the
appropriate committee on vacancies or by the party committee. 7
Furthermore, the courts have ruled that a party's voters should not
be unrepresented at the polls even if it is necessary to order a write-
in primary to nominate a candidate.'8 The recodified Election Law
now provides for write-in primaries.'29
presumption that the officer acts properly which is not rebutted by a negative inference.
Locascio v. Feuer, 34 N.Y.2d 976, 318 N.E.2d 603, 360 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1974). Absent fraud,
evidence of an oath may not be necessary to the extent it is shown that the signers are fully
informed of the purpose of the petition. La Mendola v. Mahoney, 49 App. Div. 2d 798, 379
N.Y.S.2d 234 (4th Dep't 1975), although Pilat v. Sachs, 59 App. Div. 2d 515, 397 N.Y.S.2d
804 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 984, 398 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977), would appear to over-
rule La Mendola insofar as the "work product" of numerous notaries and commissioners of
deeds was invalidated for failure to render oaths. In Pilat it was argued that the filing of a
petition on its face purported to be taken under oath but which was not, constituted fraud
per se since such act constituted a misdemeanor, but the courts did not accept this position.
See also notes 168-76 and accompanying text infra.
121. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-132(2).
122. Id. § 6-140. The signing must be witnessed by one qualified to sign the nominating
petition, hence, if such person had voted i n a primary election or signed a valid and effective
designating or nominating petition for the same office, all signatures so collected would be
invalid. Id. § 6-138. See, Carroll v. McNab, - App. Div. 2d __, 398 N.Y.S.2d 549 (2d
Dep't 1977) (persons who previously signed valid designating petitions for the same office
could not act as subscribing witnesses for indepenent petition).
123. Id. § 6-134(6) (designating petitions); § 6-138(4) (nominating petitions).
124. Id. § 6-144.
125. Id. § 6-146.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 6-148. Such vacancies may be caused by declination by the designee, or a tie
vote at a primary. The committee on vacancies may act where a candidate is disqualified
although the petition pursuant to which the candidacy was proffered is otherwise valid.
Marley v. Hamilton, 55 App. Div. 2d 864, - N.Y.S.2d - (2d Dep't 1976).
128. Hunting v. Power, 20 N.Y.2d 680, 229 N.E.2d 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1967).
129. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-166 (McKinney 1976).
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Section 6-120(1) of the recodified Election Law restricts candida-
cies in primaries to enrolled members of the designating party,' 3
absent specific approval by the party committee having jurisdiction
over the designation.' 3' This section's predecessor, commonly re-
ferred to as the "Wilson-Pakula Law,"'32 was designed purposely to
prevent the "raiding" of one political party by another.'3 3 Out-of-
party designations must be authorized by an appropriate party
committee;' 3 however, that committee need not be constituted
within the particular political subdivision, so long as party rules
provide that the particular committee represents the subdivision. 
35
The party itself retains the sole discretion to determine how this
authorization is to be granted 13  but where the rules are silent the
court of appeals has reasoned in Dent v. Power, 37 that the appropri-
ate committee would be one constituted within the political subdi-
vision.' 3 When a party does not have a local committee established
within a political subdivision, the party's State Committee will be
directed to authorize the designation. '3
B. Standing to Object
Both qualified voters and aggrieved candidates have standing to
contest election matters,'"0 including objections to primary designa-
130. Id.
131. Id. § 6-120(3).
132. N.Y. Elec. Law § 137(4) (McKinney 1976).
133. Werbel v. Gerstein, 191 Misc. 275, 78 N.Y.S.2d 440, aff'd, 273 App. Div. 917, 78
N.Y.S.2d 926 (2d Dep't 1948); Ingersoll v. Curran, 188 Misc. 1003, 70 N.Y.S.2d 435, aff'd,
297 N.Y. 522, 74 N.E.2d 465 (1947).
134. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-120(3) (McKinney 1976).
135. Id. In Egan v. Previte, 65 App. Div. 2d 862, - N.Y.S.2d - (2d Dep't 1976) the
court determined that the "appropriate committee" was comprised of members of the Queens
County Republican Executive Committee from the affected congressional district.
136. Miller v. Meisser, 22 N.Y.2d 318, 239 N.E.2d 532, 292 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1968).
137. 307 N.Y. 826, 122 N.E.2d 103 (1954).
138. Id. at 827, 122 N.E.2d at 104. Recourse to a local committee is unnecessary when
party rules provide an authorized cummittee. Anderson v. Meisser, 22 N.Y.2d 316, 239 N.E.2d
531, 292 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1968).
139. This was the case in Langley v. Erway, 22 N.Y.2d 781, 239 N.E.2d 559, 292 N.Y.S.2d
694 (1968), in which the court of appeals determined that in the absence of a duly constituted
county committee in Schoharie County, a designation of the Conservative Party for Albany
and Schoharie Counties could be made only by the State Committee of the Conservative
Party.
140. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 16-102 (McKinney 1976). Section 16-100 vests the supreme
court with jurisdiction over Article 16 matters.
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tions and nominations. Qualified voters are those who are eligible
to vote for a particular candidate in the primary election.' 4 ' This
limitation is based upon the structure of the primary system of New
York:
In many States, voters may cross party lines and vote in any party's primar-
ies, but in New York State, they may vote only in the primary of the party
in which they enrolled the previous year. Therefore, in this State, an enrolled
voter would seem to have an interest only as to the primaries in the party in
which he or she enrolled."'
Candidates are "aggrieved" and accorded standing when the mat-
ter involves the interests of the candidate in the office sought.'13 The
restriction regarding party lines is generally inapplicable to candi-
dates. '
In Pilat v. Sachs,'45 petitioners objected to the nominating peti-
tions of the Liberal Party designating a candidate for the office of
Mayor of the City of New York. Respondents, citing Wydler v.
Christenfeld, '" moved for dismissal arguing that the action, comm-
enced by two enrolled members of the Liberal Party (who had
served general and specific objections on the Board of Elections),
had not been brought by the "real party in interest"-a member of
the Republican Party seeking the nomination for mayor. The mo-
141. Mahoney v. Lawley, 301 N.Y. 425, 94 N.E.2d 587 (1950); Decatur v. Board of Elec.,
47 Misc. 2d 647, 263 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 735, 262 N.Y.S.2d 808
(3d Dep't), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 848, 210 N.E.2d 649, 263 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1965).
142. In re Dimentstein, 184 Misc. 126, 128, 50 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (Sup. Ct.), aff d, 255
App. Div. 722, 6 N.Y.S.2d 750 (2d Dep't 1938). But see In re Brook, 169 Misc. 369, 6 N.Y.S.2d
954 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
143. Hunting v. Power, 54 Misc. 2d 120, 122, 281 N.Y.S.2d 676, 679 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 28
App. Div. 2d 826, 282 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 680, 229 N.E.2d 227, 282
N.Y.S.2d 548 (1967).
144. As to the nomination of a candidate who has not enrolled as a member of the party
in the political subdivision involved, pursuant to Election Law § 137(4), (1976 N.Y. Laws ch.
233, § 6-120) the court of appeals in Wydler v. Cristenfeld, 35 N.Y.2d 719, 720, 320 N.E.2d
278, 278, 361 N.Y.S.2d 647, 647 (1974), substantially limited the standing of those who could
contest such nomination:
[Section 137(4)] has as its purpose the regulation of the affairs of a political party
and is intended to have as its beneficiaries, only members of that political party or
one who asserts that he was entitled to the authorization thereunder. It is of no interest
to others that formalities have not been followed, so long as the purpose of subdivision
4 of Section 137 is not frustrated.
145. - App. Div. 2d - , 397 N.Y.S.2d 804, (1st Dep't), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 984,
N.E.2d -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977).
146. 35 N.Y.2d 719, 320 N.E.2d 278, 361 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1974).
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tion was denied by a Special Referee whose report was subsequently
adopted by the court. The referee stated:
It was stipulated that the expenses for prosecuting this proceeding are being
paid by the Committee for Goodman (the campaign organization of the Re-
publican candidate). The testimony of Pilat (an objector), Osborne (a hand-
writing expert), and Steele (the campaign co-ordinator for the Republican
candidate), make it clear that the Goodman campaign organization is vigor-
ously prosecuting this proceeding . . . . He (the Republican) is the one who
is the prime force behind the proceeding, who controls it through the
pursestrings. Goodman's interest in this proceeding is not a jurisdictional
defect under Matter of Wydler against Christenfeld . . . . That case dealt
with a candidate of another party challenging a certificate issued pursuant
to section 137 of the Election Law.
This is a proceeding by two objectors specifically authorized by Sections
145 and 330, Subdivision 1, of the Election Law. An objector, as opposed to
a candidate aggrieved, is likely to be a nominee of a particular political
organization or candidate. The statute does not prohibit this. 4 '
C. Irregularities
Authenticated petitions filed in proper form, and bearing the re-
quisite number of signatures, are presumed valid, 4 ' but are. open to
objection before the appropriate board of elections 4 ' and the su-
preme court. 50 The late filing of a designating petition is a fatal
defect. 5 '
Written objections to petitions, both general 5 ' and specific,'53
must be timely filed 4 with the appropriate election board. 55 Notice
must be given to all interested parties. 5 '
147. - Misc. 2d , aff'd, -App. Div. 2d , 397 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
42 N.Y.2d 984, - N.E.2d -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977).
148. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-154(11) (McKinney 1976); Acosta v. Previte, 51 App.
Div. 2d 960, 381 N.Y.S.2d 690 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 720, 349 N.E.2d 865, 384 N.Y.S.2d
765 (1976).
149. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-154(2) (McKinney 1976).
150. Id. § 16-102.
151. While there had been some ambiguity in this regard due to the language of sections
143 and 149b of the Election Law (see In re Kesselring, 68 Misc. 2d 28, 324 N.Y.S.2d 648
(Sup. Ct. 1971); Ramos v. Alpert, 41 App. Div. 2d 1014, 344 N.Y.S.2d 217 (3d Dep't), aff'd,
32 N.Y.2d 904, 300 N.E.2d 158, 346 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1973)), late filing is considered fatal. Carr
v. Board of Elec., 40 N.Y.2d 556, 356 N.E.2d 713, 388 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976).
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The technicalities of the Election Law are not meant to discour-
age or entrap the naive or freshman office seeker. Rather, by facili-
tating the verification of petitions, the Election Law seeks to pre-
vent fraud on the public and other candidates.'57 Thus, the Election
Law requires only substantial compliance with most sections, al-
though some sections are of sufficient importance to mandate strict
and uniform compliance.'
Petition signers must be enrolled voters of the party and entitled
challenged petition. Maniscalco v. Power, 8 Misc. 2d 677, 168 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Once an objector has filed objections to a petition, he is entitled to notice in subsequent
judicial proceedings. In re Sweeney, 209 N.Y. 567, 103 N.E. 164, 143 N.Y.S. 727 (1913); Jones
v. Gallo, 37 App. Div. 2d 793, 324 N.Y.S.2d 850 (4th Dep't 1971). But see In re Strainere, 42
N.Y.2d 984, - N.E.2d -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977). Although local Board of Election
regulations generally require service of objections on the first named member of the Commit-
tee on Vacancies there is a division of opinion as to whether the Committee on Vacancies
designated in a petition need be joined in subsequent judicial actions. See Roman v. Power,
10 N.Y.2d 793, 177 N.E.2d 447, 220 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1961); Kowal v. Dmochowski, 10 N.Y.2d
794, 177 N.E.2d 447, 220 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1959); Arens v. Shainswit, 37 App. Div. 2d 274, 324
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 663, 274 N.E.2d 444, 324 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1971).
Service on the Committee reasonably designed to give notice may be sufficient to achieve
jurisdiction. Contessa v. McCarthy, 40 N.Y.2d 890, 357 N.E.2d 1004, 389 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1976).
In Pilat v. Sachs, the first named member of the Committee on Vacancies had been served
copies of the general and specific objections to the contested petition as required by the
regulations of the Board of Elections of the City of New York and testified to personal service
of the petition and order to show cause within the statutory fourteen-day period. However,
the caption of such petition and order did not name such person and the order did not provide
for service on him. In affirming the determination of the supreme court in this regard, the
appellate division stated:
Respondent argues that the petition is fatally defective in failing to join the first named
member of the Committee on Vacancies. . . as a "necessary" party. Petitioner count-
ers that Mr. Davidson was named in the petition portion of the Petition and Order to
Show Cause, had notice of the proceeding and participated in the proceeding, and
therefore is within the jurisdiction of the court. In Matter of Lloyd v. Power, 37 App.
Div. 2d 792, the court said "Under the provisions of CPLR 1001-1004 there are no
longer 'necessary parties' but only parties who 'ought' to be joined". The statute is
clear as to when joinder may be excused. (CPLR 1001(b)) . . . Respondent's argument
must therefore fall.
157. See text accompanying notes 181-204 infra.
158. See, e.g., Rosen v. McNab, 25 N.Y.2d 798, 250 N.E.2d 709, 303 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1969);
Rutter v. Coveney, 51 App. Div. 2d 1049, 381 N.Y.S.2d 519 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 993,
348 N.E.2d 913, 384 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1976). In Roman v. Sachs, 42 N.Y.2d, - N.E.2d __,
__ N.Y.S.2d - (1977), the insertion' of the words "new voter" in the witness statement
was found to be "sufficiently and accurately informative and in compliance with the Election
Law." For the effect of a failure to omit either required information or the "declaration of
support and nomination," i.e., omission of the words: "In witness whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand, the day and year placed opposite my signature," see, Cairo v. Harwood, 42
N.Y.2d 1098, - N.E.2d __, __ N.Y.S.2d - (1977).
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to vote at the next primary.'59 Identification of signers is deemed
essential and both the failure to list and the incorrect listing of the
signer's election or assembly district is a fatal deformity requiring
the invalidation of his signature,' 0 since it hinders both election
officials and potential petition objectors from quickly verifying peti-
tion signatures. 6'
Generally, sheets must be consecutively numbered.'62 On the
sheet, candidates must be identified by the county or other geo-
graphical unit describing the office sought,'63 unless this is ob-
vious.'6 ' Absent evidence of fraud, properly explained erasures and
alterations do not generally cause the invalidation of the petition
sheets,' 5 unless these modifications are made subsequent to execu-
tion.'66
Subscribing witnesses to the petition must be enrolled members
of the party.'67 Each subscribing witness must personally obtain the
signatures,'" and require identification of each signer.' 5 Personal
159. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-132 (McKinney 1976). If a voter moves his place of
residence to a location within the same election district, that voter still is eligible to vote.
However, if he moves outside the district and does not reregister with the Board, he is
ineligible. See GAssMAN, 16 ELECTION LAw DECISIONS AND PROCEDUa 156 (2d ed. 1962).
160. Sciarra v. Donnelly, 45 App. Div. 2d 941, 359 N.Y.S.2d 322 (2d Dep't), rev'd 34
N.Y.2d 970, 318 N.E.2d 602, 360 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1974); Berry v. Dodd, 51 App. Div. 2d 1050,
382 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 995, 348 N.E.2d 914, 384 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1976);
Lane v. Meisser, 24 App. Div. 2d 720, 263 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1965).
161. Berry v. Dodd, 51 App. Div. 2d 1050 (2d Dep't), alf'd, 38 N.Y.2d 995, 348 N.E.2d
914, 384 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1976).
162. Gilmore v. Kugler, 21 App. Div. 2d 293, 249 N.Y.S.2d 960 (3d Dep't 1964). If the
number of sheets is not material, or if only an insubstantial violation of section 6-130 occurs,
the defect is not fatal. Lawrence v. Coveney, 39 App. Div. 2d 951, 333 N.Y.S.2d 444 (2d Dep't
1972) (designating petition consists of only four sheets); Lamula v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d 873, 192
N.E.2d 725, 243 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1963) (6 sheets of a 685-page petition were not bound in
consecutive order).
163. Moritt v. Cohen, 264 App. Div. 951, 36 N.Y.S.2d 875 (2d Dep't 1942). This is proba-
bly not the rule outside of New York City. Practi v. Van Wait, 47 Misc. 2d 898, 263 N.Y.S.2d
396 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
164. Caffery v. Lawley, 21 App Div. 2d 749, 250 N.Y.S.2d 677 (4th Dep't 1964).
165. Mastantuono v. Meisser, 180 Misc. 667, 43 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct.), afd, 266 App.
Div. 919, 43 N.Y.S.2d 752 (2d Dep't 1943).
166. Warsoff v. Cohen, 289 N.Y. 108, 44 N.E.2d 386 (1942).
167. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 6-132 (McKinney 1976); Sims v. Board of Elec., 22 N.Y.2d
755, 239 N.E.2d 384, 292 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1968), a/f g, 30 App. Div. 2d 766, 292 N.Y.S.2d 382
(4th Dep't).
168. Metzger v. Eagen, 16 N.Y.2d 837, 210 N.E.2d 644, 263 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1965), aff'g, 24
App. Div. 2d 719, 263 N.Y.S.2d 202 (2d Dep't).
169. Resmick v. Power, 32 App. Div. 2d 801, 302 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1969).
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knowledge of each signer is not required;'70 the level of cognition is
that "in the exercise of reasonable judgment and circumspection the
said witness is satisfied in his mind and conscience that the person
whose signature he authenticates is in fact the person he represents
himself to be.' 7'
The failure to list, or the incorrect listing of election or assembly
districts of subscribing witnesses,' as well as misstatements con-
cerning residence,'73 prior registration, 74 or the number of signatures
on any page' are all fatal defects; and each sheet of the petition
containing defective verifications will be invalidated.'
When notaries or commissioners of deeds collect signatures or
petitions,' 77 the signers must affirm the statements regarding the
designation or nomination of the candidates. 7 ' A presumption exists
170. Faerber v. Le Fever, 51 App. Div. 2d 1051, 381 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 38
N.Y.2d 1019, 348 N.E.2d 924, 384 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).
171. Stephens v. Heffernan, 186 Misc. 275, 59 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
172. Rutter v. Coveney, 38 N.Y.2d 993, 348 N.E.2d 913, 384 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1976); Gordon
v. Catania, 45 App. Div. 2d 937, 358 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1974). But see Vari v. Hayduk, - Misc.
2d __, rev'd, 59 App. Div. 2d 571, 397 N.Y.S.2d 824 (2d Dep't) aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 176, -
N.E.2d - (1977), in which it was held unnecessary to include the Assembly District
designation for offices to be filled in the City of Mount Vernon since all of such City is in an
Assembly District.
173. Dorsey v. Cohen, 268 N.Y. 620, i98 N.E. 523, 282 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1935).
174. Crosbie v. Cohen, 258 App. Div. 738, 14 N.Y.S.2d 897 (2d Dep't 1939).
175. Clune v. Hayduk, 45 App. Div. 2d 939, 359 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't), rev d, 34 N.Y.2d
965, 318 N.E.2d 600, 360 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1974).
176. Maurin v. Allis, 28 App. Div. 2d 810, 281 N.Y.S.2d 697 (4th Dep't), aff 'd, 20 N.Y.2d
671, 229 N.E.2d 60, 282 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1967).
177. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, §§ 6-132(3), 6-140(2); Donnelly v. Dowd, 17 App. Div. 2d
712, (2d Dep't), af'd, 12 N.Y.2d 651, 185 N.E.2d 10, 232 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1962).
178. The person being sworn must realize that he or she is being sworn and this must be
shown unequivocally. The administration of the oath is called a jurat. "The jurat is a state-
ment by the notary that the facts contained in the body of the affidavit were sworn to before
him, with the date thereof, and signed by the officer, with his official title and a statement
of his jurisdiction." 42 NY Jur, Notaries and Commissioners of Deeds § 17. The form in which
an oath is administered is not rigid, although some form is essential. The form must
"[appeal] to the conscience of the person to whom it is administered and [bind] him to
speak the truth . . . .[an unequivocal and present act by which the affiant consciously
takes upon himself the obligation of an oath" is required. Furthermore the afflant must be
in the personal presence of the person administering the oath so that a certain identification
can be made. 2 NY Jur, Affidavit, Oath, and Affirmation § 4 (emphasis added). The case
law expounding the above principles of law began with O'Reilly v. People, 86 N.Y. 154 (1881)
and has remained constant to the present. A recent case enunciated the standard as follows:
As far back as 1881 in O'Reilly v. People . . .it was determined that to constitute a
valid oath for the falsity upon which perjury will lie there must be an unequivocal and
present act in some form in the presence of an officer authorized to administer oaths,
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
that this has been done.'79 In all cases, the subscribing witness,
notary or commissioner must sign the authenticating statement at
the bottom of each sheet.'
Fraud is the most intolerable election irregularity since it most
seriously violates the integrity of the electoral process. When nu-
merous forgeries and false attestations are found, courts will invali-
date every sheet on which they appear.'"' If a subscribing witness
falsely swears to one petition, all the petitions signed by that wit-
ness will be invalidated. 2 When a candidate participates in obtain-
ing fraudulent signatures, all his petitions will be declared invalid., 3
One court stated its view toward fraud as follows:
If designating petitions are to perform their lawful and intended function, it
is essential that they be kept free from fraud in their making. It is to that
end that the legislature has made meticulous requirements with respect to
them. The surest way to keep them free from fraud is to let it be known that
any taint of fraud will wholly invalidate them, rather than merely set the
court to the task of counting up the number of fraudulent instances in order
to see whether they reduce the number of signatures below the minimum
required by law.184
Even though the candidate has not participated in the fraud, his
petitions may still be invalidated if the court finds that the petitions
are permeated with fraud. The New York State Court of Appeals
has closely scrutinized nomination petitions when fraud by the can-
didate is alleged. For example, in 1968, in Aronson v. Power,'5 the
court found a designating petition requiring three hundred fifty sig-
by which the affiant consciously takes upon himself the obligation of the oath. That
stated principle has been followed to date.
People v. Lieberman, 57 Misc. 2d 1070, 1071, 294 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (Sup. Ct. 1968). See also
People v. Grier, 42 App. Div. 2d 803, 346 N.Y.S.2d 422 (3rd Dep't 1973); Bookman v. City of
New York, 200 N.Y. 53, 56, 93 N.E.2d 190, 191 (1910).
179. Locascio v. Feuer, 45 App. Div. 2d 937, 358 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d
976, 318 N.E.2d 603, 360 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1974).
180. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, §§ 6-132 and 6-140 (McKinney 1976).
181. In re Brady, 246 App. Div. 561, 282 N.Y.S. 964 (2d Dep't 1935); Haas v. Costigan,
10 N.Y.2d 889, 179 N.E.2d 513, 223 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1961), affg, 14 App. Div. 2d 809, 221
N.Y.S.2d 138 (2d Dep't).
182. In re Burns, 199 Misc. 1005, 106 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 278 App. Div. 1023,
106 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 601, 100 N.E.2d 885 (1951).
183. Abrahams, New York Election Law, 115-16 (1950).
184. In re Weisberger, 22 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1012 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 392, 22
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1st Dep't 1940).
185. 22 N.Y.S.2d 759, 239 N.E.2d 385, 292 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1968), rev'g, 30 App. Div. 2d
651, 291 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't).
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natures was invalidated by fraudulent practices and irregularities
affecting ten percent of the signatures on nine sheets out of a total
of one hundred twenty sheets.' The court held the petition was so
permeated with fraud as to invalidate the entire petition, even
though there was no proof that the candidate had participated in
the fraud. The candidate, however, had failed to testify as to his
lack of participation and knowledge. In 1976, in Galiber v. Previte, "7
the court found an entire petitioning procedure permeated with
fraud with the knowledge and active participation of the candidate
when it was shown that: (1) the signatures consistently were taken
without regard to the signer's eligibility to sign, and without any
effort to inform the signers for whom and for what purposes they
were signing; (2) the subscribing witnesses were not in fact the
persons who took the signatures; and (3) the dates on the subscrib-
ing witnesses' statements did not correspond with the dates on
which the signatures were taken.' Faced with such pervasive irreg-
ularity in which the candidate actively joined, the court invalidated
the entire petition.
During the 1976 election campaign, the court of appeals decided
two fraud cases, which are difficult to harmonize. Each was decided
over an incredulous dissent. In Ruiz v. McKenna,"8 the court held
that a designating petition, in which nearly sixty percent of the
signatures were invalidated by the Board of Elections, was not per-
meated with fraud. 9 ' While recognizing that the evidence "might
well have supported an inference either that there was fraudulent
intent which infected the petition, or that the irregularities similar
to those proved permeated the whole designating petition," the
court refused to draw that inference as a matter of law.' 9' The record
revealed that respondent actively and personally engaged in the
solicitation of signatures, 2 and that the high percentage of invalid
186. The irregularities affected 1,181 of the 1,223 signatures. Id.
187. 54 App. Div. 2d 513, 386 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 822, 355 N.E.2d
790, 387 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1976).
188. Id. at 823, 355 N.E.2d at 791, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
189. 40 N.Y.2d 815, 355 N.E.2d 787, 387 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1976).
190. Id. at 818, 355 N.E.2d at 789, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 560. Of the 2,570 signatures obtained
by the candidate, the Board of Elections invalidated 1,514. Since there remained 1,056 valid
signatures, satisfying the statutory requirement of 1,000, the Board validated the petition.
191. Id. at 817, 355 N.E.2d at 788, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
192. The candidate personally subscribed 189 of the 198 sheets and thus certified that he
witnessed 2,495 of the 2,570 signatures submitted. Id. 355 N.E.2d at 788, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
19771
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signatures was due to soliciting signatures under false pretenses,
failure to obtain signatures personally, disregard for voter registra-
tion and party enrollment, ineligibility of subscribing witnesses, and
numerous other irregularities. 3 Judge Jasen, dissenting, found this
"a consistent pattern of surface irregularity . . . fatal to a claim of
substantial compliance" which was a "direct result of [the candi-
date's] failure to undertake reasonable efforts to protect the quality
of his signatures.""'9 This pattern of massive irregularity, said Judge
Jasen, permeated the entire petition, and it was therefore "well
within the traditional powers of the court to declare that, as a mat-
ter of law, in the truest sense of that word of art, the entire petition
is invalid."'95
A week later, in a per curiam decision in which Judge Jasen
concurred, the court in Proskin v. May, "I held that where over fifty
percent of the signatures on a designating petition were invalid,
fraud and irregularity so permeated the petition as a whole to call
for its invalidation, despite a showing that the candidate had no
personal knowledge of the fraud or irregularity. Judge Cooke dis-
sented, pointing out that the balance of the signatures, well above
the minimum required for designation, were affirmatively found to
be valid, and the declaration of their invalidity was a "forfeiture or
penalty" because of the invalid signatures. "Such a sanction cer-
tainly is not in order where there is no knowledge or participation
by the candidate, otherwise, an innocent candidate would be penal-
ized and, perhaps even more importantly, valid signatures would be
disenfranchised."' 9 7
A recent court of appeals decision has made it more difficult to
harmonize Ruiz and Proskin. In Pilat v. Sachs,'98 5,373 signatures
were filed for a designation requiring 2,551 valid signatures. The
Board of Elections of the City of New York invalidated 1,390 signa-
tures. The supreme court, after a line by line examination, validated
248 of these invalidated signatures but invalidated an additional
193. Id. See also note 30 supra.
194. Id. at 818, 355 N.E.2d at 788, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 559 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
195. Id., 355 N.E.2d at 789, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60.
196. 40 N.Y.2d 829, 355 N.E.2d 793, 387 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976). Sixty-three signatures were
required for a valid petition. Of the 220 signatures contained in the petition, 116 were declared
invalid, leaving 104 valid signatures (41 more than necessary).
197. Id. at 831, 355 N.E.2d at 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 565 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
198. 42 N.Y.2d 984, 398 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977), aff'g, 397 N.Y.S.2d 804 (lst Dep't).
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1,554 signatures. Of the signatures which it invalidated, the court
found 372 "non-genuine" signatures (111 of which were additionally
invalid for other reasons) and voided 189 signatures collected by
certain subscribing witnesses "as being permeated with fraud or
irregularity." It likewise invalidated 1,104 signatures for the failure
of certain notaries or commissioners of deeds to administer oaths to
signers of the petitions. Nevertheless, 2,668 signatures remained
valid, and this was sufficient to validate the petition.
Petitioner argued that the procedures employed by respondent
constituted a pattern of irregularities that required the court to
invalidate the petition under the permeation theory in Proskin. The
supreme court rejected this argument, stating:
There is a presumption of validity which attends any petition filed in proper
form with the Board of Elections. The evidence as presented by the petitioner
is wholly insufficient to warrant a finding that the entire petition was tainted
with fraud. The Court finds that the irregularities were unpatterned and are
to be overlooked, in order to further the broader public interest in favor of a
meaningful election choice . . . . The bona fide signatories of the Liberal
Party petitions should not be deprived of their right to designate and vote
for the candidate of their choice.1"
The Appellate Division affirmed, 00 impliedly rejecting the per-
meation theory in Proskin. The appellate court also rejected narrow
and technical construction of the Election Law:
The entire object of our election laws, in furtherance of the democratic
process, is to provide qualified voters the opportunity to designate a candi-
date of their choice, and to require a narrow and technical construction of
these laws would defeat rather than effectuate that objective. It is reasonably
to be expected that in the collection of over 5,000 signatures technical inad-
vertencies. . . , human nature being what it is, are bound to arise and those
signatures characterized as irregular have been the subject of scrutiny by two
referees and the Justice in Special Term and in due course striken from the
petition . 01
The court of appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision which
cited Ruiz v. McKenna, and added only: "The courts below consid-
ered the question of permeation of fraud and irregularities, usually
a question of fact, and resolved in each instance this question in
199. Id.
200. 397 N.Y.S. 2d 804 (1st Dep't 1977).
201. Id. at 805.
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respondent's favor. '"202
This series of cases suggests that while allegations of fraud in the
making of petitions still trigger close scrutiny by the courts, the
court will allow a certain amount of "human error" and
"inadvertence" to pass unpenalized. The difference between fraud
and error is a question of fact, but the court will not declare a
petition invalid unless there is a clear pattern of fraud or irregularity
which permeates the petition.
In contrast with the court's generosity in dealing with human
error, the court does not treat so lightly plain sloppiness. Less than
two months after deciding Proskin and Ruiz, the court of appeals
may well have dictated the outcome of the 1976 presidential election
when it rejected the independent nominating petition filed by Eu-
gene McCarthy. 03 Since the individual signatures were solicited and
collected in a "haphazard manner," the court invalidated the peti-
tions, finding less than even substantial compliance with the stat-
ute. 2 0
4
VI. Board of Elections and Judicial Review
A. Board Review
Board of Elections review of petitions05 is generally commenced
pursuant to the fling of objections, 206 although a board arguably has
a duty to invalidate petitions sua sponte.207 The various boards of
elections are empowered to make their own rules consistent with the
Election Law regarding objections to petitions. 208 Failure to serve
objections on an opposing candidate in accordance with the rules of
the local board of elections could preclude a board determination as
to the validity or invalidity of the petitions.2 1
The statute authorizing local boards to consider objections to
202. 42 N.Y.2d 984, 398 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977).
203. Contessa v. McCarthy, 40 N.Y.2d 629, 357 N.E.2d 968, 389 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1976).
204. Id. at 630, 357 N.E.2d at 969, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
205. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-154 (McKinney 1976).
206. This ability is implied from the Board's inherent power to review petitions absent
specific objections. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 233, § 6-154(3) (McKinney 1976).
207. Id. at § 6-154(2) (McKinney 1976).
208. Swan v. Cohen, 179 Misc. 69, 37 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 956,
30 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1st Dep't), afl'd, 286 N.Y. 678, 36 N.E.2d 913 (1941).
209. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 6-154 (McKinney 1976).
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petitions has been interpreted"" as limiting the power of election
boards to a consideration of the face of the petition:
[T]he Legislature did not intend to vest in these local officials the prelimi-
nary power to pass on the validity of the nominating papers filed with them
where the decision involved questions of fact. They may pass on purely minis-
terial questions, but I do not think the Legislature intended that they should
go behind the face of the papers."'
Furthermore, when a board exceeds the scope of its power, mem-




At common law, judicial review of election matters did not exist,
since such matters were considered to be in the province of the
"political arm" of the government. Today, judicial review extends
only so far as specifically granted by the state legislature.', 3
210. In re Frankel, 212 App. Div. 664, 208 N.Y.S. 721 (2d Dep't 1925).
211. Id. at 671, 208 N.Y.S. at 727.
212. Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E.2d 68 (1952), aff'g 279 App. Div. 898,
111 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1st Dep't 1945).
213. See People ex rel. Conliss v. North, 72 N.Y. 124 (1878); State ex rel. Morris v.
Sherman, 63 N.D. 9, 245 N.W. 877 (1932); Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417, 152 P.2d 157
(1944); State ex rel. Myers v. Gamer, 148 W. Va. 92, 133 S.E.2d 82 (1963); Longshore v. City
of Homewood, 277 Ala. 444, 171 So. 2d 453 (1965). Article 16 of the recodified Election Law
grants jurisdiction to the courts to review election procedures. See in particular sections 16-
102 (former section 330(1) and (2)) (pursuant to which an aggrieved candidate or objector,
and, under the new law, the chairman of a party committee, may commence an action con-
testing the nomination or designation of a candidate); section 16-106 (former sections 330(4),
(5) and (6)) (pursuant to which an aggrieved candidate or certain voters may contest the
canvass of returns in an election; and section 16-114 (formerly section 471) (pursuant to which
campaign expenditure filings may be mandated and the Fair Campaign Code [section 3-106,
formerly section 472] may be enforced). It is not clear whether an action to enforce the Fair
Campaign Code requires an exhaustion of administrative remedies before the State Board of
Elections. See article 3 Title I. The court of appeals had appeared to construe strictly and
narrowly the courts' jurisdiction to review election matters in Yevoli v. Christenfeld, 29
N.Y.2d 591, 272 N.E.2d 898, 324 N.Y.S.2d 317, revg 37 App. Div. 2d 153, 322 N.Y.S. 750
(1st Dep't 1971). In Yevoli the court adopted the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division,
stating: "we believe that a fair reading of all of the provisions of the Election Law compels
the conclusion that courts have no right or business to become enmeshed in the internal
workings of our political parties." 37 App. Div. 2d at 158, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 755 (emphasis
added) (see notes 13 through 15 and accompanying text supra); and in Kane v. Republican
County Committee, 12 N.Y.2d 658, 185 N.E.2d 12, 232 N.Y.S. 36, aff'g 17 App. Div. 2d 707,
230 N.Y.S.2d 761 (2d Dep't 1962). In Kane, the petitioner sought delivery of certain informa-
tion designed to facilitate his securing designating petitions. In rejecting his request, the
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The supreme court possesses plenary and summary jurisdiction to
review the validity of petitions and elections,"' even if such ques-
tions had been raised previously before the Board of Elections.!" '
This is not an inherent power of the supreme court; however, it is
conferred entirely by statute.2  Moreover, the statute does not em-
power the supreme court to cancel, set aside, or annul a general
election." 7 When a. petition has been invalidated, the court may
Appellate Division said:
Petitioner brought this proceeding . . . in order to obtain signatures on his primary
petition . . . inasmuch as petitioner made no claim that he sought the requested
information in order to object to or dispute the designation of his opponent . . . . the
Supreme Court has no summary jurisdiction under section 330 to grant the relief
requested, which invoked 'no question of law or fact' raised by an aggrieved candidate
as to designation or nomination of any candidate.
17 App. Div. 2d at 708, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
In Farber v. Carroll, 59 App. Div. 2d 514, 397 N.Y.S.2d 803, (1st Dep't), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d
989, -_ N.E.2d - , - N.Y.S.2d - (1977), the appellate division appeared to extend
the jurisdiction of the courts under section 330 of the former law, beyond that established in
Yevoli, stating:
The parties, candidates for separate public office agreed, somewhat anomalously, to
join in one Republican primary petition, with petitioner-respondent Farber being per-
mitted at the same time to enter into a similar arrangement with another person, a
rival candidate for the same office sought by respondent-appellant Carroll. As should
have been expected, after not too long, Carroll taxed Farber with favoritism toward
his rival and a falling-out ensued. For whatever reason, Carroll, who had possession of
the collection of signed petitions, refused Farber's demand that they be timely filed
with the Board of Elections alternative to being delivered to Farber. The instant suit
ensued, culminating in an order by Special Term that the petitions be filed. We hold
that order to have been properly made, and further that petitioner-respondent never
waived the protection of section 330 of the Election Law. The petitions, to the extent
that they expressed the desire of enrolled voters to have the designees on the primary
ballot, belonged to neither party exclusively, and to allow retention by either party to
the detriment of the other would be to frustrate the electoral scheme completely.
The appellate division found the order of the supreme court to be "within the ambit of section
330 of the Election Law, to wit, 'the designation of. . . . [a] . . . . candidate . . .". The
supreme court had not found the action to be within the ambit of section 330 because it was
instituted prior to and not during the statutory 14-day period under that section and had
predicated jurisdiction under 42 U.SC. § 1983 (the Civil Rights Act) based on the motion of
Carroll's attorney for a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction constituting actions under color of
state law. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) holding that, absent invidious discrimi-
nation, the Civil Rights Act does not apply to state elections.
214. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 16-100 (McKinney 1976).
215. In re Vona, 150 Misc. 649, 271 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 240 App. Div. 827, 266
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 706, 188 N.E. 130 (1934); Flowers v. Wells,
57 App. Div. 2d 636 (2d Dep't 1976).
216. In re Bailey, 14 Misc. 2d 55, 56 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 6 App. Div. 2d 996, 177 N.Y.S.2d
898 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 746, 153 N.E.2d 389, 178 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1958).
217. Oster v. Village of Jordan, 42 Misc. 2d 432, 248 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
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Periconi v. Power, 48 Misc. 2d 391, 265 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
The supreme court does have the power to review and correct general election returns. Rice
v. Power, 19 N.Y.2d 106, 224 N.E.2d 865, 278 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1967). In Rice it was contended
that the election of a delegate to the New York State Constitutional Convention was subject
to the exclusive review of the Convention itself. Id. at 108, 224 N.E.2d at 866, 278 N.Y.S.2d
at 363. The court of appeals rejected this view, stating:
In our view, section 330 of the Election Law validly vests summary jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court to order a recanvass of the absentee and military ballots cast in such
an election. It is true that the State Constitution (art. XIX, § 2) makes the Convention
the ultimate 'judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members.' How-
ever, the New York City Board of Elections has the duty of determining and certifying
which candidate received 'the greatest number of votes' for the office of delegate to
the Constitutional Convention (Election Law, § 276), and no provision in the Constitu-
tion deprives the courts of jurisdiction under section 330 to inquire whether the board
has properly discharged its duty. Although the Convention is privileged to disregard
the certificate issued by the Board of Elections in determining whether a delegate was
properly elected and should be seated, this does not in any way vitiate the power of
the courts to require that the certificate reflect an accurate tally of the votes cast.
Id.
In a subsequent action arising out of the same matter, Rice v. Power, 19 N.Y.2d 474, 227
N.E. 2d 583, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 657 (1967), the court of appeals noted that if an action to review
election returns was not within the scope of section 330, the plenary judicial remedy was quo
warranto, id. at 482, 227 N.E.2d at 588, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 664. In such case, the court consid-
ered the degree of proof necessary to alter a recanvass of votes, stating:
The Supreme Court is given summary jurisdiction to determine a controversy arising
from the canvass of returns by a city Board of Canvassers and may direct a recanvass
or correction of the board's determination (§ 330, and subd. 5).
But if the court is to change the result of the board's recanvass, which the statute
expressly provides shall supersede that of the election inspectors, it must do so on a
record which will show reliably that the board on recanvass has been mistaken in its
result.
Id. at 477-78, 227 N.E.2d at 585, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
The power of the supreme court to review the returns in primary elections and order new
elections is not limited as in the case of general elections. See Note, Primary Challenges in
New York: Caselaw v. Coleslaw v. Election Protection, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 318 (1973). For a
discussion of the standards that arguably should be applied (but which to date have not been
so applied) in determining whether a new primary election should be ordered, see Finklestein
and Robbins, Mathematical Probability in Election Challenges, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 241 (1973).
For a case which defies not only the mathematical probabilities referred to above but
simple logic, see Biaggi v. The City of New York Board of Elections, Sup. Ct., Bronx Co.,
1974 (Index No. 14704/1974). In that case a primary election was held in the Conservative
Party for the purpose of nominating a candidate for the office of Member of the House of
Representatives. The incumbent Democratic congressman Mario Biaggi was authorized to
run in the primary by the Executive Committee of the Conservative Party of Bronx County
and was opposed by an enrolled Conservative, Francis'L. McHugh.
In the primary, McHugh received 304 votes to Biaggi's 297. Biaggi instituted a proceeding
for a new election pursuant to section 330 of the Election Law. In the supreme court, the
Special Referee found 112 "suspect votes" noting "[aipplying a probability analysis, it is
unnecessary to strain the probability to assume the likelihood that even a small portion of
the 112 suspect or irregular votes could produce a different result."
However, the court's method of determining the "suspect votes" is questionable. Due to
the necessity to certify a candidate quickly for the November general election not all of the
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order the Board of Elections to provide enrolled voters with a write-
in ballot."'
The courts have distinguished actions to validate petitions from
invalidation proceedings," 9 and have treated the former more liber-
election districts in the congressional district were recanvassed. Only 55 election districts
(which had accounted for 286 votes in the Conservative Party primary) were reviewed. In the
selfsame districts and on the same day, 7,305 persons participated in a Democratic primary.
Respondent McHugh argued that the suspect votes should have been allocated proportionally
to the two primaries, i.e., only .038% of such suspect votes should be attributed to the
Conservative primary since it was unlikely that every irregularity took place in the Conserva-
tive primary. The referee rejected this argument finding "it is a view not clearly adopted by
any legal authority, and lends itself to the discarded formula of mathematical possibility."
If time had permitted (the shortness of time however does not shift the burden of proof which
is on the petitioner seeking a new election), it should have been possible to determine how
many enrolled Conservatives participated in the primary and any discrepancy between that
number and the total Biaggi-McHugh votes would be clearly irregular. Indeed, this procedure
was utilized in 15 election districts, wherein the total vote in the Conservative primary was
73 and the recorded signatures only 60, leaving 13 irregularities. Unless an apportioning
formula is utilized, no primary of a party held contemporaneously with a primary of dis-
parately larger participation will be saved from being set aside.
In one election district, other than those referred to above, the referee reported that 38 votes
were recorded although only 6 enrolled Conservatives had signed in to vote, hence there were
32 suspect votes. Respondent McHugh argued, to no avail, that such suspect votes could not
have produced a different result since in the district in question, the 56th election district of
the 80th Assembly District, Biaggi was credited with 26 votes to McHugh's 12, hence, if only
6 votes were valid and were assumed to be in Biaggi's favor, the effect of such irregularity
would be to increase McHugh's margin of victory by 8 votes (the net effect of the irregularity).
This policy of giving effect to the reasonable application of any irregularity has been followed.
Haney v. Comm. of Elections, - App. Div. 2d - , 398 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1977)
(where only three enrolled members of a party voted in a primary in a particular district, it
was impossible for candidates to receive four votes); Christ v. Dodd, 91 Misc.2d 250, 399
N.Y.S.2d 168, afj'd, - App. Div. 2d -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 550, aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 1078, -
N.E.2d __, - N.Y.S.2d -. (1977) (irregularities apportioned as to their natural effects
would not change outcome of primary).
218. Hunting v. Power, 54 Misc. 2d 120, 281 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 28 App. Div.
2d 826, 282 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 680, 229 N.E.2d 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d 548
(1967).
219. In Pell v. Coveney, 37 N.Y.2d 494, 336 N.E.2d 421, 373 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1975), the court
of appeals permitted late commencement of an action to validate a petition where the delay
was occasioned by the delay of the Board of Elections to give notice of its determination of
invalidity. Since Pell, the courts have routinely extended the time for service of orders to
validate a petition where the responsible Board of Elections does not act within the statu-
tory period. Colvin v. Romeo, - App. Div. 2d - , 398 N.Y.S.2d - (4th Dep't 1977).
Prior to Pell, it was common to seek an order contingent upon the action of the Board of
Elections. See, e.g., Gassman, Election Law, Decisions and Procedure (Election Law Forms,
Petition in Support of Motion to Validate Designating Petition), 935 (2d ed. 1962).
Although an action to validate is generally commenced by service of a petition and order
to show cause, in In re Straniere, 59 App. Div.2d 572, 397 N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 42
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oally, 220 apparently believing that a candidate should not be denied
access to the election procedure by a procedural bar if he can show
a meritorious claim.
2. Institution of Proceedings
Proceedings under article 16 of the recodified Election Law22'
must be instituted within the prescribed time periods. Failure to do
so deprives the court of jurisdiction.22 2 Recently, the court of appeals
reaffirmed this rule:
Service by mailing was incomplete under the particular statute so long as the
persons to be served did not receive delivery within the 14-day period.
2 3
However, the court did not strictly adhere to this rule in Contessa
v. McCarthy224 which dispensed with proof of actual receipt of serv-
ice when process was mailed five days before the end of the limita-
tion period. The necessity for proof of delivery is unclear, and guid-
ance can only be ascertained by the principle that mailing must be
accomplished "at a time when it might reasonably have been ex-
pected that receipt would occur within the statutory period. 225
C. Venue
The proper venue for election law matters is the Special Term of the
Supreme Court in the county in which the dispute arises. If no
N.Y.2d 984, - N.E.2d __, 398 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977), the Appellate Division, Second
Department, reversed the determination of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, and per-
mitted an action based on a counterclaim to a petition and order to show cause to invalidate
the petition. See also Ambro v. Coveney, 20 N.Y.2d 850, 231 N.E.2d 776, 285 N.Y.S. 2d 83
(1967).
220. In Butler v. Hayduk, 37 N.Y.2d 497, 336 N.E.2d 423,373 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1975), (heard
and decided at the same time as Pell v. Coveney) the court of appeals denied relief on the
basis that the failure to serve all necessary parties was in the control of the party commencing
the action. But see, Wager v. New York State Board of Elections, - App. Div. 2d __
398 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't 1977). Although the recitation of the facts by the court appears
to indicate that mail service was not completed in accordance with either the statute or the
order, the court found jurisdiction where service on one party by certified mail was effected
by notice received from the post office of a Hempstead delivery which could not be completed
because the post office was closed.
221. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 16-102 (2).
222. King v. Cohen, 293 N.Y. 435, 57 N.E.2d 748 (1944).
223. Thompson v. State Board of Elections, 40 N.Y.2d 814, 815, 355 N.E. 2d 796, 797, 387
N.Y.S.2d 567, 569 (1976).
224. 40 N.Y.2d 629, 357 N.E.2d 968, 389 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1976).
225. Bruno v. Peyser, 40 N.Y.2d 827, 355 N.E.2d 792, 387 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1976).
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Special Term is in session, the matter may be brought before any
Special Term in the same judicial district.226
VII. Conclusion
The recodification of the Election Law has as its purpose simplify-
ing and clarifying227 the election procedures in New York. "The bill
contains a minimum of substantive changes, but makes numerous
technical and procedure amendments. ' 28
A major benefit of the recodification is a presentation of the ad-
ministrative procedures in a more understandable and readable
form, 2 ' thus making it a practical aid to party committees and
candidates, but the recodification also serves a long-range pur-
pose:213 in removing obsolete and obtuse provisions from the law,
and consolidating and clarifying the remaining provisions in a more
orderly and meaningful manner, it has prepared the groundwork for
future substantive election law reform.
Further revision in the manner of registration is no doubt to come,
even though a recent study indicates that easier registration does
not necessarily result in increased voter turnout.231 Still, the recodi-
226. Doyle v. Supreme Court, 286 App. Div. 469, 145 N.Y.S. 2d 19 (3d Dep't. 1955).
227. See note 3 supra.
228. State Board of Elections, Memorandum in Support I (May 27, 1976).
229. New York State Assembly Elections Committee, Memorandum in Support (1976).
230. Id. See also League of Women Voters, Legislative Memorandum I (1976).
231. N. Y. Times, November 20, 1977, p. 24, col. 4.
The study was conducted by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate,
described as a bipartisan, non-profit group, on the November 8, 177 election, and noted that
voter decline was greatest in areas that had adopted postcard registration.
President Carter has proposed various methods of extending the franchise by making
registration easier. Critics of his proposal argue that relaxation of registration safeguards
would increase election fraud. In Donohue v. Board of Elections, 435 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), the court considered the possibility of such fraud. The action was commenced by
members of the Republican, Conservative and Labor parties to enjoin the New York State
electors from casting their votes in the Electoral College for the Democratic Party nominee.
The petitioners charged that "the ballots cast by legitimate voters [in the national election]
were debased and diluted by the illegal votes allegedly cast by thousands of unqualified
voters." Id. at 961.
A statistical sampling of voters was prepared under the court's guidelines and supervision,
which purported to demonstrate that a potential 138,207 votes (4.9% of the voting population)
were "confirmed frauds", and a potential 306,107 votes (10.8% of the voting population,
including the "confirmed frauds") were "irregular votes." Id. The large number of "confirmed
frauds" and "irregularities" was caused in large part by the mail registration procedures in
the Election Law (N.Y. Elec. Law, § 153, as amended, 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 5-210).
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fication has begun the necessary housecleaning without which any
attempt at substantive reform would fail.
It would appear that the critics of easier registration and voting procedures, at least based
on practices in New York, would have reason to be concerned if adequate safeguards are not
employed.

